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Who gets to be seen as knowledgeable, and by what means and standards? While contemporary analytic philosophy takes a propositional focus, asking under what conditions a knowing subject S can know proposition p, the actual history of knowledge use and theory is more complex. In this course, we will focus on the gaps between the theory and the history. We will think about the challenges of second-hand testimony, both theoretical (Gettier problem, Miranda Fricker, C.A. Coady) and historical (witchcraft trials, Jim Crow lynchings). The problem of informal knowledge like gossip and rumor will also get our theoretical attention (Bertolotti & Magnani, Max Gluckman, Lorraine Code, Patricia Turner) as well as historical (Robert Darnton, #ShittyMedia Men). Next we will consider the ways in which first-person confessions are problematized (Augustine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Adrienne Rich, memoirs). We will conclude by thinking about how, paradoxically, claims of ignorance can be epistemically powerful (José Medina). |
